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34 
Response 
No Explanation Required? A Reply to 
Jeffrey Bellin’s eHearsay 
Colin Miller†
  You see why I tell you I ain’t want to be no damn juror. Some dude 
just come by my house and tell me he going pay me money to say not 
guilty. Now I don’t know what to do, because if I tell the judge they’re 
going to know it’s me. 
 
  I know, right. Now I scared because I don’t want them to do any-
thing to me or [my daughter][. . .]***1
The above were text messages sent by a juror to her sister 
after Ikim Blackett allegedly threatened and then tried to bribe 
her in an attempt to convince her to find one of several defend-
ants “not guilty” of various drug crimes.
 
2 At Blackett’s ensuing 
trial for jury bribery, the juror testified that, while she was on 
her front porch, Blackett approached her and mentioned the 
word “nitroglycerin.”3 The juror then “asked Blackett what ‘ni-
troglycerin’ meant and he responded ‘not guilty.’”4 When this 
threat fell on deaf ears, Blackett offered the juror $1,500 in ex-
change for her vote.5 After again declining, the juror went to 
her bedroom and sent the above text messages.6
Should the text messages have been admissible because 
the juror took the witness stand and testified at trial? If the ju-
ror were “unavailable” at trial, should the text messages have 
been admissible?
  
7
 
 † Associate Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law; Blog 
Editor, EvidenceProf Blog, 
 According to Professor Jeffrey Bellin’s arti-
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/evidenceprof/. 
Copyright © 2013 by Colin Miller.  
 1. Brief for the Appellee, United States v. Blackett, 481 Fed. App’x. 741 
(3d Cir. 2012) (No. 2011-1556), 2012 WL 248361, at *3 (alteration in original).  
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See FED. R. EVID. 804(a) (describing circumstances under which “[a] 
declarant is considered to be unavailable as a witness”). 
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cle, eHearsay, the answer to both questions is “yes” as he crafts 
hearsay rules that cover both situations. This Response Piece 
agrees with Professor Bellin on the first question but disagrees 
with him on the second. 
I.  PRIOR WITNESS STATEMENTS UNDER FEDERAL 
RULE OF EVIDENCE 801(D)(1) AND PROPOSED RULE 
801(D)(1)(D)   
A. THE RULE AGAINST HEARSAY 
 Federal Rule of Evidence 801(c) indicates: 
“Hearsay” means a statement that:  
the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or 
hearing; and  
a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in  
the statement.8
In turn, Federal Rule of Evidence 802 deems hearsay in-
admissible in the absence of an exception, exclusion, or federal 
statute.
 
9
is premised on the theory that out-of-court statements are subject to 
particular hazards. The declarant might be lying; he might have mis-
perceived the events which he relates; he might have faulty memory; 
his words might be misunderstood or taken out of context by the lis-
tener. And the ways in which these dangers are minimized for in-
court statements—the oath, the witness’ awareness of the gravity of 
the proceedings, the jury’s ability to observe the witness’ demeanor, 
and, most importantly, the right of the opponent to cross-examine—
are generally absent for things said out of court.
 Rule 802 deems hearsay evidence presumptively in-
admissible both because such evidence is unreliable and be-
cause the jury has an inability to assess that unreliability at 
trial. As the Supreme Court explained in Williamson v. United 
States, Rule 802: 
10
B. THE RULE 803 AND 804 EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE AGAINST 
HEARSAY 
 
Meanwhile, Federal Rules of Evidence 803 and 804 create 
hearsay exceptions for statements made under circumstances 
that allow them to “possess circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness sufficient to justify nonproduction of the de-
 
 8. FED. R. EVID. 801(c). 
 9. FED. R. EVID. 802. Federal Rule of Evidence 802 states, “Hearsay is 
not admissible unless any of the following provides otherwise: a federal stat-
ute; these rules; or other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.” 
 10. Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 598 (1994). 
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clarant in person at the trial.”11 In other words, a statement 
qualifying under a Rule 803 or 804 exception speaks for itself, 
meaning that the declarant need not take the witness stand 
and submit himself to the crucible of cross-examination con-
cerning the statement.12 Indeed, for a statement to qualify for 
admission under Rule 804, the declarant has to be “unavaila-
ble” at trial13 while Rule 803 statements are admissible “re-
gardless of whether the declarant is available as a witness.”14
Statements qualifying for admission under hearsay excep-
tions are thought to be sufficiently trustworthy for an amalgam 
of defensible and questionable reasons. A dying declaration un-
der Rule 804(b)(2)
 
15 is admissible because it is thought that a 
person does not want to die with a lie on his lips.16 A statement 
made for purposes of diagnosis or treatment under Rule 
803(4)17 is believed to be truthful under the “selfish motive” 
theory that a patient fears that a lie to a doctor could lead to 
misdiagnosis and/or mistreatment.18
 
 11. See FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note. 
 And a business record 
 12. See, e.g., Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 200 (1987) (“This 
concern is sometimes satisfied when evidence is admitted under a hearsay ex-
ception, even where no cross-examination of the declarant occurs at trial.”). If 
the statement, however, is “testimonial,” the declarant would need to submit 
himself to cross-examination for the statement to comport with the Sixth 
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 
(2004). 
 13. See FED. R. EVID. 804(a). 
 14. FED. R. EVID. 803; see FED. R. EVID. 804 advisory committee’s note 
(“Rule 803 . . . is based upon the assumption that a hearsay statement falling 
within one of its exceptions possesses qualities which justify the conclusion 
that whether the declarant is available or unavailable is not a relevant factor 
in determining admissibility.”). 
 15. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2). Rule 804(b)(2) provides an exception to the 
rule against hearsay: “In a prosecution for homicide or in a civil case, a state-
ment that the declarant, while believing the declarant’s death to be imminent, 
made about its cause or circumstances.” 
 16. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820 (1990). There are actually two 
reasons why dying declarations are thought to be reliable. As noted by the Su-
preme Court of Alaska, “[t]wo basic reasons have been advanced for admission 
of such testimony: necessity, because of the witness’ death, and a belief that 
the approach of death removes ordinary motives to misstate.” Johnson v. 
State, 579 P.2d 20, 24 (Alaska 1978). 
 17. See FED. R. EVID. 803(4). Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4) provides an 
exception to the rule against hearsay for “[a] statement that: (A) is made for—
and is reasonably pertinent to—medical diagnosis or treatment; and (B) de-
scribes medical history; past or present symptoms or sensations; their incep-
tion; or their general cause.” 
 18. See, e.g., Willingham v. Crooke, 412 F.3d 553, 562 (4th Cir. 2005) 
(“This exception to the hearsay rule is premised on the notion that a declarant 
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qualifying for admission under Rule 803(6)19 is considered reli-
able because a company has an incentive to keep accurate rec-
ords to ensure that it stays in the black or is aware when it dips 
into the red.20
C. RULE 801(D)(2) AND STATEMENTS MADE BY OR ON BEHALF OF 
A PARTY 
 
Unlike Rules 803 and 804, Federal Rule of Evidence 
801(d)(2) defines five statements as nonhearsay under the as-
sumption that the speaker (or the party to whom the statement 
is attributed) can and, in most cases, will testify at trial. Rule 
801(d)(2) defines a statement as nonhearsay if: 
The statement is offered against an opposing party and:  
(A) was made by the party in an individual or representative capacity;  
 
seeking treatment ‘has a selfish motive to be truthful’ because ‘the effective-
ness of medical treatment depends upon the accuracy of the information pro-
vided.’”). 
 19. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) provides an 
exception to the rule against hearsay for: 
[a] record of an act, event, condition, opinion, or diagnosis if:  
(A) the record was made at or near the time by—or from information transmit-
ted by—someone with knowledge;  
(B) the record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity of a 
business, organization, occupation, or calling, whether or not for profit;  
(C) making the record was a regular practice of that activity;  
(D) all these conditions are shown by the testimony of the custodian or another 
qualified witness, or by a certification that complies with Rule 902(11) or (12) 
or with a statute permitting certification; and  
(E) neither the source of information nor the method or circumstances of prep-
aration indicate a lack of trustworthiness. 
 20. See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1175 (2011) (“Hearsay law 
exempts business records, for example, because businesses have a financial 
incentive to keep reliable records.”). Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8) provides 
a similar hearsay exception for: 
[a] record or statement of a public office if:  
(A) it sets out:  
(i) the office’s activities;  
(ii) a matter observed while under a legal duty to report, but not in-
cluding, in a criminal case, a matter observed by law-enforcement 
personnel; or  
(iii) in a civil case or against the government in a criminal case, fac-
tual findings from a legally authorized investigation; and  
(B) neither the source of information nor other circumstances indicate 
a lack of trustworthiness. 
The “[j]ustification for the exception is the assumption that a public official 
will perform his duty properly and the unlikelihood that he will remember de-
tails independently of the record.” FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s 
note. 
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(B) is one the party manifested that it adopted or believed to be true;  
(C) was made by a person whom the party authorized to make a 
statement on the subject;  
(D) was made by the party’s agent or employee on a matter within the 
scope of that relationship and while it existed; or  
(E) was made by the party’s coconspirator during and in furtherance 
of the conspiracy.21
Under Rule 801(d)(2), then, a statement is not hearsay if 
(1) it is adopted by a party—a criminal defendant, civil defend-
ant, or civil plaintiff—or made by a party or the party’s 
authorizee (e.g., publicist or press secretary), employee, or co-
conspirator; and (2) it is offered against the party. 
 
Notably, “[n]o guarantee of trustworthiness is required in 
the case of” a Rule 801(d)(2) statement.22 Instead, the point is 
that “[t]here is less concern about trustworthiness, especially in 
civil cases, because the party against whom the statements are 
offered generally can take the stand and explain, deny, or rebut 
the statements.”23 Civil plaintiffs and defendants likely have to 
testify at trial while criminal defendants can choose whether to 
testify or exercise their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.24 Rule 801(d)(2) statements are thus admissible 
“based . . . upon the identity of the speaker” rather than the 
trustworthiness of the statement, with a party not being able to 
“complain about the lack of an opportunity to cross-examine 
himself.”25
D. PRIOR WITNESS STATEMENTS UNDER RULE 801(D)(1) 
 
While Rule 801(d)(1) also defines certain statements as 
nonhearsay, it does not do so based upon the identity of the 
speaker. Rule 801(d)(1) defines a statement as nonhearsay if: 
The declarant testifies and is subject to cross-examination about a 
prior statement, and the statement:  
(A) is inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony and was given un-
 
 21. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2). 
 22. FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee’s note. 
 23. Jordan v. Binns, 712 F.3d 1123, 1128 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 24. See U.S. Const. amend V. 
 25. Guest v. Allstate Ins. Co., 205 P.3d 844, 860 (N.M. Ct. App. 2009), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part 244 P.3d 343 (N.M. 2010). The same logic applies to 
statements by authorizees, employees and co-conspirators under Federal 
Rules of Evidence 801(d)(2)(C), (D), and (E). As the Supreme Court noted in 
Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 190 (1987), “it was thought that a 
party could not complain of the deprivation of the right to cross-examine him-
self (or another authorized to speak for him) or to advocate his own, or his 
agents, untrustworthiness.” 
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der penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding or in a 
deposition;  
(B) is consistent with the declarant’s testimony and is offered to rebut 
an express or implied charge that the declarant recently fabricated it 
or acted from a recent improper influence or motive in so testifying; or  
(C) identifies a person as someone the declarant perceived earlier.26
A statement qualifying for admission under Rule 801(d)(1) 
can be made by a party or a party’s representative, but it can 
also be made by many other declarants, including alleged vic-
tims and innocent bystanders. Therefore, unlike Rule 801(d)(2), 
Rule 801(d)(1) explicitly requires that the declarant testify at 
trial for his prior statement to be admissible.
 
27
Indeed, the requirement that the declarant testify at trial 
and be “subject to cross-examination about [the] prior state-
ment” is fundamental to the efficacy of Rule 801(d)(1).
  
28 The 
Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 801 indicates that prior 
witness statements are generally deemed hearsay but then 
points out the three exclusions created Rules 801(d)(1)(A)-(C).29 
The Advisory Committee did not try to argue that statements 
falling under the auspices of Rules 801(d)(1)(A), (B), or (C) have 
sufficient circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness; in-
stead, the Committee acknowledges that the judgment concern-
ing their classification “is one more of experience than logic.”30 
Accordingly, Rule 801(d)(1) “requires in each instance, as a 
general safeguard, that the declarant actually testify as a wit-
ness.”31
Statements qualifying for admission under Rule 801(d)(1) 
are thus admissible not because they are thought to be suffi-
ciently reliable when made. Nor are they admissible solely be-
cause the declarant testifies at trial; declarant testimony is in-
sufficient to allow for the admission of the vast majority of prior 
witness statements. Instead, Rule 801(d)(1) statements are 
admissible because they are (1) likely more reliable than the 
declarant’s testimony at trial; and (2) relevant both to prove the 
truth of the matter asserted and to impeach and/or bolster the 
credibility of a declarant who has testified at trial. 
  
 
 26. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1). 
 27. See id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee’s notes. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
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1. Prior Inconsistent Statements Under Rule 801(d)(1)(A) 
As noted, Rule 801(d)(1)(A) deems a witness’s prior incon-
sistent statement to be nonhearsay if that prior statement “was 
given under penalty of perjury.”32 Certainly, the fact that a 
Rule 801(d)(1)(A) statement is given under oath makes it more 
reliable than the run-of-the-mill hearsay statement. Moreover, 
this “penalty of perjury” requirement distinguishes a Rule 
801(d)(1)(A) statement from a prior inconsistent statement not 
given under oath; such a statement is hearsay and admissible 
under Federal Rule 613 only to impeach the witness and not to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted.33
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1) sets forth a hearsay ex-
ception for former testimony by an unavailable declarant and 
defines former testimony as: 
 But the mere fact that 
the prior statement was given subject to the penalty of perjury 
would not ordinarily satisfy hearsay concerns. 
Testimony that:  
(A) was given as a witness at a trial, hearing, or lawful deposition, 
whether given during the current proceeding or a different one; and  
(B) is now offered against a party who had—or, in a civil case, whose 
predecessor in interest had—an opportunity and similar motive to de-
velop it by direct, cross-, or redirect examination.34
 
 32. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A). 
 
 33. See FED. R. EVID. 613. Rule 613 states as follows: 
(a) Showing or Disclosing the Statement During Examination. When 
examining a witness about the witness’s prior statement, a party 
need not show it or disclose its contents to the witness. But the party 
must, on request, show it or disclose its contents to an adverse party’s 
attorney.  
(b) Extrinsic Evidence of a Prior Inconsistent Statement. Extrinsic ev-
idence of a witness’s prior inconsistent statement is admissible only if 
the witness is given an opportunity to explain or deny the statement 
and an adverse party is given an opportunity to examine the witness 
about it, or if justice so requires. This subdivision (b) does not apply to 
an opposing party’s statement under Rule 801(d)(2). 
As the First Circuit noted in United States v. Martin, 694 F.2d 885, 888 (1st 
Cir. 1982), a prior inconsistent statement admitted under Rule 613 “is admit-
ted not for the truth of the matter asserted in the prior statement but to im-
peach the credibility of the witness.” Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit pointed 
out in United States v. Day, 789 F.2d 1217, 1222 (6th Cir. 1986), that, “[i]n 
seeking to limit the admissibility of prior inconsistent statements for substan-
tive purposes, Congress determined that statements given under oath at a 
‘formal proceeding’ were inherently more reliable than statements given in the 
absence of such formalities.” 
 34. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1). See, e.g., United States v. Burbank, No. 88-
5634, 1990 WL 86147, at *2 (4th Cir. June 12, 1990) (“Under 804(b)(1), former 
testimony is admissible in criminal cases only when the party against whom 
the testimony is offered had an opportunity to cross-examine or otherwise de-
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Therefore, for a declarant’s former testimony to be admis-
sible under Rule 804(b)(1), it is not enough that the testimony 
was given under oath and that some party had the opportunity 
to question the declarant; instead, the party against whom that 
testimony is later offered (or its civil predecessor) must have 
had that opportunity.35 Moreover, the opportunity, alone, is in-
sufficient; the opposing party must also have had a similar mo-
tive to develop the declarant’s testimony at the prior trial, hear-
ing, or deposition.36
No such requirement exists under Rule 801(d)(1)(A). In-
stead, the Rule allows for the admission of prior inconsistent 
statements given under oath regardless of whether the oppos-
ing party had any opportunity to question the declarant when 
the declarant made those prior statements.
 
37
First, Rule 801(d)(1)(A) statements are likely more reliable 
than the declarant’s testimony at trial. According to the Advi-
sory Committee’s Note to Rule 801, “[i]n many cases, the incon-
sistent statement is more likely to be true than the testimony 
of the witness at the trial because it was made nearer in time 
to the matter to which it relates and is less likely to be influ-
enced by the controversy that gave rise to the litigation.”
 Therefore, Rule 
801(d)(1)(A) statements are not as reliable as Rule 804(b)(1) 
statements, but they are admissible for the two reasons appli-
cable to all three of the Rule 801(d)(1) exclusions. 
38 
Moreover, Rule 801(d)(1)(A) was based in large part on “con-
cern about witness intimidation—i.e., witnesses who could be 
intimidated or were otherwise vulnerable to pressure with the 
result that their prior statements were a more reliable guide to 
the fact finder than their testimony in the courtroom.”39
 
velop the witness's testimony.”). 
  
 35. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1); United States v. Feldman, 761 F.2d 380, 
385 (7th Cir. 1985) (“In determining whether a party had such a motive, a 
court must evaluate not only the similarity of the issues, but also the purpose 
for which the testimony is given.”). 
 36. See id. 
 37. See, e.g., People v. Farguharson, 731 N.W.2d 797, 802 (Mich. Ct. App. 
2007) (“This Court held that the witnesses’ grand jury testimony was properly 
admitted as a prior inconsistent statement under MRE 801(d)(1)(A), but would 
have been inadmissible under MRE 804(b)(1) because ‘defendant had no ‘op-
portunity . . . to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination’ 
in front of the grand jury.’”). 
 38. Fed. R. Evid 801 advisory committee’s note (quoting Comment, Cali-
fornia Evidence Code §1235). 
 39. Conley v. N.L.R.B., 520 F.3d 629, 636 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Conley 
Trucking, 349 NLRB 308 (2007)). 
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Second, prior inconsistent statements are relevant both to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted and to impeach the cred-
ibility of a declarant who has testified at trial. This relevance is 
ensured by the fact that, under Rule 801(d)(1)(A), “[t]he declar-
ant is in court and may be examined and cross-examined in re-
gard to his statements and their subject matter.”40
First, it can use the statement to impeach William, i.e., to 
call into question his credibility based upon the contradiction 
between his two statements. The most classic example of such 
impeachment is the question, “‘Were you lying then or are you 
lying now?’”
 Assume that 
William testifies at Dan’s trial for murdering Vince: “I saw Dan 
fire the fatal shot that killed Vince.” As a result, the jury finds 
Dan guilty of the murder, and the prosecution later charges 
Dan’s co-conspirator, Carl, with Vince’s murder. The prosecu-
tion again calls William, who now testifies, “I saw Carl fire the 
fatal bullet that killed Vince.” Under Rule 801(1)(A), the de-
fense can now introduce William’s prior inconsistent statement 
for two purposes. 
41 “Forcing a witness to admit to the jury that he is 
a liar is the Holy Grail of cross-examination,”42 the assumption 
being that no “juror would give credence to any statement of”43 
the witness caught in such a contradiction. Second, because the 
prior inconsistent statement is not hearsay, it can be offered to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted, i.e., that it was indeed 
Dan, and not Carl, who fired the fatal bullet.44
2. Prior Consistent Statements Under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) 
  
Like prior inconsistent statements under Rule 801(d)(1)(A), 
prior consistent statements under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) are insuffi-
ciently reliable when originally uttered to be admissible. Re-
turning to the hypothetical in which Dan is on trial for Vince’s 
murder, assume again that William testifies, “I saw Dan fire 
the fatal shot that killed Vince.” Assume that two days after 
the shooting and six months before trial, William had told his 
friend, Fred, “I saw Dan fire the fatal shot that killed Vince.” If 
 
 40. FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee’s note. 
 41. Murdoch v. Castro, 609 F.3d 983, 1007 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Murdoch v. Castro, 489 F.3d 1063, 1071 (9th Cir. 2007), rev’d en banc, 
609 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 44. See, e.g., United States v. Dietrich, 854 F.2d 1056, 1061 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(“If a prior inconsistent statement meets the requirements of Rule 801(d)(1)(A) 
it may be admitted as substantive evidence to establish the truth of the matter 
asserted.”). 
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the defense does not claim that William’s trial testimony was a 
recent fabrication or that it resulted from a recent improper in-
fluence or motive, William’s statement to Fred would be inad-
missible hearsay that fails to qualify for admission under a 
hearsay exception or exclusion.  
Assume, however, that the defense expressly or impliedly 
claims that William’s trial testimony against Dan is a recent 
fabrication that he rendered in exchange for a favorable plea 
bargain offered to him by the prosecution a few weeks before 
trial. In this case, the elements of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) have been 
satisfied, and the prosecution can now introduce William’s prior 
consistent statement to Fred because it preceded the improper 
influence or motive—the plea deal—that allegedly caused Wil-
liam to fabricate his trial testimony.  
The allegation of recent fabrication by the defense does not 
make William’s statement to Fred any more trustworthy, but it 
does make that prior statement more reliable than William’s 
testimony at trial, which, in effect, has been labeled the fruit of 
the poisonous tree. First, “the fact that a witness made a prior 
consistent statement closer in time to the event can support 
relevant inferences that the testimony is unlikely to be the 
product of memory problems.”45 Second, “statements made be-
fore a reason to distort the truth arose would be more reliable 
than those made after such a motive arose.”46 Of course, this 
means that Rule 801(d)(1)(B) applies only to consistent state-
ments made before the improper motive arose because state-
ments made after the motive arose would be no more reliable.47
As with prior inconsistent statements, prior consistent 
statements are relevant for dual purposes. While a party intro-
duces a prior inconsistent statement to impeach a witness, a 
party uses a prior consistent statement to rehabilitate or bol-
ster the credibility of a witness who has been charged with fab-
 
 
 45. David M. Paciocco, The Perils and Potential of Prior Consistent State-
ments: Let's Get It Right, 17 CANADIAN CRIM. L. REV. 181, 214 (2013). Cf. 
United States v. Coleman, 631 F.2d 908, 914 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“Even where the 
suggestion of contradiction is only imputation of an inaccurate memory, a pri-
or consistent statement is admissible to rebut the inference.”). 
 46. Robert P. Burns, Foreword: Bright Lines and Hard Edges: Anatomy of 
a Criminal Evidence Decision, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 843, 870 (1995). 
 47. See generally Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 167 (1995) (“The 
Rule permits the introduction of a declarant's consistent out-of-court state-
ments to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive 
only when those statements were made before the charged recent fabrication 
or improper influence or motive.”). 
  
44 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW HEADNOTES [98:34 
 
ricating his trial testimony.48 Moreover, because the prior con-
sistent statement is nonhearsay and not tainted by any recent 
improper influence or motive, it is also admissible to prove the 
truth of the matter asserted, i.e., that Dan in fact fired the fatal 
shot that killed Vince.49
3. Prior Statements of Identification Under Rule 801(d)(1)(C) 
 
Both Rule 801(d)(1)(A) and Rule 801(d)(1)(B) are subject to 
Rule 801(d)(1)’s requirement that the declarant testify at trial, 
but this requirement is surplusage. A statement can be a prior 
inconsistent or consistent statement only if it is inconsistent or 
consistent with the declarant’s testimony at trial, which means, 
of course, that the declarant has to testify for either of these 
rules to apply. The same is not true of Rule 801(d)(1)(C), which 
covers prior statements of identification and helps to crystallize 
the principles unifying the three exclusions contained in Rule 
801(d)(1). 
Returning again to the hypothetical in which Dan is on tri-
al for Vince’s murder, William might pick Dan out of a lineup 
or pick his picture out of a photo array as the person whom he 
saw shoot Vince. Like prior inconsistent and consistent state-
ments, such eyewitness identifications are insufficiently relia-
ble when rendered to be admissible. Both “statistical and psy-
chological data has shown that eyewitness identifications, 
whether lineup or show-up confrontations, produce highly un-
reliable evidence and frequently are inaccurate.”50 Indeed, sev-
enty-five percent of convictions overturned due to DNA evi-
dence involved eyewitness misidentifications, and reviews of 
actual police records in four studies revealed that “about one-
third of eyewitnesses who made identifications in police inves-
tigations wrongly identified a known innocent stand-in.”51
 
 48. See, e.g., United States v. Lindemann, 85 F.3d 1232, 1242 n.8 (7th Cir. 
1996) (“FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) contains the bolstering/rehabilitation rule 
by defining as nonhearsay only those prior consistent statements that are of-
fered ‘to rebut an express or implied charge’ against a witness of ‘recent fabri-
cation or improper influence or motive.’”). 
 
 49. See, e.g., Ross v. Saint Augustine’s Coll., 103 F.3d 338, 341 (4th Cir. 
1996) (“Under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B), a prior out-of-court 
statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted is admissible . . . .”) 
 50. Christian M. Halliburton, Race, Brain Science, and Critical Decision-
Making in the Context of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 
319, 331 (2012). 
 51. The Honorable Stuart Rabner, Evaluating Eyewitness Identification 
Evidence in the 21st Century, 87 N.YU. L. REV. 1249, 1263 (2012). 
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It is thus not the independent reliability of eyewitness 
identifications that makes them admissible; instead, such pre-
trial identifications are admissible because they are thought to 
be more reliable than in-court identifications. In essence, “out-
of-court identifications made shortly after the crime a[re] of far 
greater probative value than are in-court ones where the de-
fendant can easily be picked out (he sits at defense counsel’s 
table) and where the witness testifies months or years after the 
crime.”52
This view of the relative reliability of pre-trial and in-court 
identifications is corroborated by Rule 801(d)(1)’s requirement 
that the declarant must testify for a Rule 801(d)(1)(C) identifi-
cation to be admissible. If William picked Dan out of a lineup 
and did not testify at trial, his pre-trial identification would not 
be admissible.
 
53
Whenever a party admits a pre-trial statement to prove the 
truth of the matter asserted in the statement, testimony or evi-
dence concerning the statement “presents issues of ambiguity, 
insincerity, erroneous memory, and faulty perception.”
 It is only the eyewitness’ testimony at trial that 
justifies the admission of his pre-trial identification so that the 
jury can compare or contrast the two. 
54 When 
the declarant who made such a statement does not testify, “all 
of these concerns will come to fruition because the jury will not 
have an opportunity to evaluate the declarant.”55
[R]ule 801(d)(1)(C)’s requirement that the declarant testify at trial 
and be subject to cross-examination prevents these traditional hear-
say concerns from creating an impediment and affords the jury the 
opportunity to reach its own determination about a declarant’s credi-
 This reason-
ing explains why declarants are required to testify under Rule 
801(d)(1) generally and under Rule 801(d)(1)(C) specifically:  
 
 52. Andrew E. Taslitz, What Remains of Reliability: Hearsay and Free-
standing Due Process After Crawford v. Washington, 20 CRIM. JUST., Summer 
2005, at 39, 50; see also United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 562 (1988) 
(“The premise for Rule 801(d)(1)(C) was that, given adequate safeguards 
against suggestiveness, out-of-court identifications were generally preferable 
to courtroom identifications.”). 
 53. See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189, 1210 n.19 (11 Cir. 
2005) (“Nor is it classified as a non-hearsay statement of identification under 
Rule 801(d)(1)(C), because Jetier did not testify at the trial and was not sub-
ject to cross-examination concerning that statement.”). 
 54. Gilbert M. Rein, Note, “That’s the Guy!”: Federal Rule of Evidence 
801(d)(1)(C) and Out-of-Court Statements of Identification, 34 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1539, 1563 (2013). 
 55. Id. 
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bility and the circumstances in which the statement in issue was 
made.56
The requirement that the eyewitness testify at trial also 
explains why pre-trial identifications admitted under Rule 
801(d)(1)(C) have dual relevance. Assume that William picked 
Dan out of a pre-trial lineup and then pointed to Dan at the de-
fense table at trial when asked who murdered Vince. Thereaf-
ter, the prosecution could admit William’s pre-trial identifica-
tion under Rule 801(d)(1)(C) both to bolster the credibility of 
William’s in-court identification and to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted in his pre-trial identification: that Dan was the 
murderer.
 
57
Alternatively, assume that William picked someone other 
than Dan out of a pre-trial lineup but then pointed to Dan at 
the defense table at trial when asked who murdered Vince. In 
this case, the defense could admit the pre-trial identification 
under Rule 801(d)(1)(C) both to impeach the credibility of Wil-
liam’s in-court identification and to prove the truth of the mat-
ter asserted in his pre-trial identification: that someone other 
than Dan was the murderer.
 
58
E. THE FIT BETWEEN PROPOSED RULE 801(D)(1)(D) AND THE 
RULE 801(D)(1) RATIONALES 
 
In his article, eHearsay, Professor Jeffrey Bellin proposes a 
fourth exclusion to Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1). Under 
Proposed Rule 801(d)(1)(D):  
A statement that meets the following conditions is not hearsay: (1) 
The declarant testifies and is subject to cross-examination about a 
prior statement, and the statement . . . (D) would qualify as a Record-
ed Statement of Recent Perception under Rule 804(b)(5) if the declar-
ant were unavailable.59
 
 56. Id. 
 
 57. See, e.g., State v. Joyner, 107 So.3d 675, 691 (La. Ct. App. 2012) 
(“Lieutenant Italiano’s testimony was independently admissible as 
nonhearsay, for the truth of the matter of asserted, under La. C.E. art. 
801(D)(1)(c).”). 
 58. See, e.g., Miller v. State, 687 So.2d 1281, 1285 (Al. Crim. App. 1996) 
(“An identification statement could be admissible to show lack of credibility if 
an in-court identification is inconsistent with an out-of-court one.”); see also 
State v. Wright, 730 So.2d 485, 489 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (“Further, multiple 
federal circuits have held that previous identification testimony admitted into 
evidence pursuant to FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(C) is available not simply for im-
peachment, but as substantive evidence.”). 
 59. Jeffrey Bellin, eHearsay, 98 MINN. L. REV. 7, 36. 
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This Proposed Rule would be a good fit with the rest of 
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1). Initially, as with state-
ments admissible under the three existing Rule 801(d)(1) exclu-
sions, eHearsay statements would not be admissible under 
Rule 801(d)(1)(D) based upon their independent reliability 
when they were made. This conclusion is proven by the fact 
that Professor Bellin’s exclusion covers only “recorded commu-
nication.”60 If William orally tells his friend, Fred, “I saw Dan 
shoot Vince two days ago,” Professor Bellin would specifically 
deem that statement inadmissible under his new eHearsay ex-
clusion while a text message or e-mail containing the same con-
tent and written at the same time would be admissible under 
the exclusion.61
This takes us to another similarity between proposed Rule 
801(d)(1)(D) and the three existing Rule 801(d) exclusions: the 
admissibility of eHearsay is premised on it likely being more 
reliable than the declarant’s testimony at trial. Professor 
Bellin’s proposed eHearsay exclusion is based upon the rejected 
“Statement of Recent Perception” hearsay exception, which re-
quires statements to be made somewhat soon after the declar-
ant perceives an event or condition.
 Obviously, at the time that William composed 
such a text message or e-mail, it would be no more reliable than 
his oral statement to Fred, so it must be something other than 
the independent reliability of the recorded communication that 
makes it admissible.  
62 The fact that such state-
ments are made much nearer to the event or condition than the 
declarant’s testimony at trial makes them less susceptible to 
inaccuracy due to memory loss and more likely to be accurate, 
which, as noted, is also part of the explanation for the admissi-
bility of statements under the three existing Rule 801(d)(1) ex-
clusions.63
Moreover, statements admitted under Professor Bellin’s 
eHearsay exclusion would likely be more sincere than testimo-
ny rendered at trial. In his article, Professor Bellin indicates 
that his exclusion would not cover “a statement made in con-
templation of litigation or to a person who is investigating, liti-
gating, or settling a potential or existing claim.”
 
64
 
 60. Id. at 38. 
 As noted, this 
explanation is similar to the explanations supporting the ad-
 61. Id. at 38–41. 
 62. Id. at 28. 
 63. See supra notes 38–39, 46, 52 and accompanying text. 
 64. Bellin, supra note 59, at 36. 
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mission of statements under the three existing Rule 801(d)(1) 
exclusions.  
Prior inconsistent statements admitted under Rule 
801(d)(1)(A) are seemingly “less likely [than trial testimony] to 
be influenced by the controversy that gave rise to the litiga-
tion.”65 The entire point of the Rule 801(d)(1)(B) exclusion is 
that the prior consistent statement was not influenced by the 
improper influences and motives that often accompany testi-
mony at trial.66 And the basis for admitting prior statements of 
identification under Rule 801(d)(1)(C) is the scripted nature of 
the in-court identification, in which the eyewitness knows that 
his role is to point to the accused at the defense table when 
asked who committed the crime charged.67
Of course, both of these rationales apply equally to non-
recorded statements of recent perception, which Professor 
Bellin deems inadmissible under his eHearsay exclusion. It is 
thus the recording of eHearsay that makes it admissible be-
cause, as Professor Bellin notes, “[w]hen an in-court witness re-
lates another person’s hearsay statement, a danger arises that 
the in-court witness’s testimony is unreliable. The testifying 
witness may mishear, misremember, miscommunicate, or 
(worst of all) manufacture the out-of-court speaker’s state-
ment.”
 
68
This recording requirement places proposed Rule 
801(d)(1)(D) on similar footing with Rules 801(d)(1)(A) and (C). 
One major reason Rule 801(d)(1)(A) categorizes as nonhearsay 
only prior inconsistent statements that were given at a trial, 
hearing, or deposition is that those statements were recorded 
and can be repeated verbatim at trial.
 
69 Similarly, under Rule 
801(d)(1)(C), jurors are not usually forced to rely upon a police 
officer’s account of a pre-trial eyewitness identification because 
“lineups can be and often are photographically recorded.”70
 
 65. See supra note 
  
38 and accompanying text. 
 66. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 67. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 68. Bellin, supra note 59, at 38. 
 69. See, e.g., United States v. Jacoby, 955 F.2d 1527, 1539 (11th Cir. 1992) 
(“The court permitted Jacoby to impeach Merrill by reading verbatim the 
transcript of Merrill's grand jury testimony. Jacoby thus was able to develop 
fully before the jury the alleged inconsistencies between the witness' trial and 
grand jury testimony.”). 
 70. United States v. Gallo-Moreno, 584 F.3d 751, 761 (7th Cir. 2009). But 
see Sandra Guerra Thompson, Judicial Gatekeeping of Police-Generated Wit-
ness Testimony, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 329, 353 (2012) (“It may be 
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Furthermore, as with Rule 801(d)(1)(C) and the other Rule 
801(d)(1) exclusions, an essential component of Proposed Rule 
801(d)(1)(D) is the declarant’s testimony at trial. As noted, the 
lynchpin of Rule 801(d)(1) is the requirement that the declarant 
testify at trial because, without the opportunity for cross-
examination, the jury lacks the opportunity “to reach its own 
determination about a declarant’s credibility and the circum-
stances in which the statement in issue was made.”71
Finally, as with evidence admitted under the other hearsay 
exclusions contained in Rule 801(d)(1), evidence admitted pur-
suant to Proposed Rule 801(d)(1)(D) would serve twin purposes. 
Assume that William sends his friend, Fred, a text message 
that says, “OMG! Dan killed Vince two days ago.” If William 
testifies at trial that he saw Dan kill Vince, his text message 
would be admissible under Proposed Rule 801(d)(1)(D) for two 
purposes. First, the prosecution could use the text message to 
bolster the credibility of William based upon the consistency 
between his two statements. Basically, this would be similar to 
a prior consistent statement but with the recording of the prior 
statement obviating the need for the opposing party to claim 
that the declarant’s trial testimony was a recent fabrication. 
Second, the text message would be admissible to prove the 
truth of the matter asserted: that Dan in fact did kill Vince. 
 For rea-
sons that will be described in Section III, it makes even more 
sense to require the declarant of eHearsay to testify at trial and 
be subjected to cross-examination.  
Assume instead that William sends his friend, Fred, a text 
message that says, “OMG! Carl killed Vince two days ago.” If 
William testifies at trial that he saw Dan kill Vince, the text 
message would also be admissible for dual purposes. First, the 
prosecution could use the text message to impeach William’s 
credibility based upon the inconsistency between the two 
statements. Basically, this would be similar to impeachment 
through a prior inconsistent statement or a prior statement of 
identification that contradicts the declarant’s in-court identifi-
cation. Second, the text message would be admissible to prove 
the truth of the matter asserted: that it was in fact Carl who 
killed Vince. 
 
common to preserve a photograph of a lineup or the photo array used in a case, 
but interviews with eyewitnesses have generally not been well documented 
and certainly have not been electronically recorded. Some jurisdictions have 
made great strides in this area, but most have not.”). 
 71. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
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F. PROPOSED RULE 801(D)(1)(D) AS AN EXTENSION OF RULE 
803(5) 
1. Why Rule 803(5) Should Be Moved to Rule 801(d)(1) 
Another reason to include Professor Bellin’s eHearsay ex-
clusion in Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1) is the similarity 
between Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(D) and 
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(5). At first, this statement might 
appear odd because Rule 803(5) is not part of Rule 801(d)(1). 
This article contends, however, that Rule 803(5) should be a 
part of Rule 801(d)(1) and that its current location in the Rules 
is a mere historical relic. 
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(5) creates an exception to the 
rule against hearsay for:  
A record that:  
(A) is on a matter the witness once knew about but now cannot recall 
well enough to testify fully and accurately;  
(B) was made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in 
the witness’s memory; and  
(C) accurately reflects the witness’s knowledge.  
If admitted, the record may be read into evidence but may be received 
as an exhibit only if offered by an adverse party.72
Because of its placement in Federal Rule of Evidence 803, 
this “recorded recollection” exception is supposed to apply “re-
gardless of whether the declarant is available as a witness.”
 
73 
The recorded recollection exception thus seems like an odd fit 
with Federal Rule of Evidence 803 because it envisions a wit-
ness both being available and testifying at trial, albeit without 
a complete enough memory to testify fully and accurately.74
As noted, hearsay is admissible under Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 804 only if the hearsay declarant is deemed “unavailable” 
 It is 
the incomplete memory of the witness that confused the issue 
of where to place the recorded recollection rule. 
 
 72. FED. R. EVID. 803(5). 
 73. FED. R. EVID. 803. 
 74. See FED. R. EVID. 803(5)(A). See United States v. Sawyer, 607 F.2d 
1190, 1193 (7th Cir. 1979) (“[S]ince the hearsay declarant in this case was 
available for cross-examination, and since the referral report would otherwise 
qualify as a recorded recollection, we find no reversible error in the admission 
of the report.”); Smith v. State, 880 So.2d 730, 736 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) 
(“In order for a memorandum or record to qualify as recorded recollection, the 
witness must testify that he made an accurate record of the fact or event or 
that he is confident that the facts would not have been written unless they 
were true.”).  
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under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a).75 One way to prove that 
a declarant is “unavailable” is with the declarant’s own testi-
mony that he or she cannot “remember[] the subject matter,” 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a)(3).76
Locating the exception [in Rule 803] of the rules [wa]s a matter of 
choice. There were two other possibilities. The first was to regard the 
statement as one of the group of prior statements of a testifying wit-
ness which are excluded entirely from the category of hearsay by Rule 
801(d)(1). That category, however, requires that declarant be “subject 
to cross-examination,” as to which the impaired memory aspect of the 
exception raises doubts. The other possibility was to include the ex-
ception among those covered by Rule 804. Since unavailability is re-
quired by that rule and lack of memory is listed as a species of una-
vailability by the definition of the term in Rule 804(a)(3), that 
treatment at first impression would seem appropriate. The fact is, 
however, that the unavailability requirement of the exception is of a 
limited and peculiar nature. Accordingly, the exception is located at 
this point rather than in the context of a rule where unavailability is 
conceived of more broadly.
 The drafters 
of the recorded recollection exception were thus presented with 
three placement options: 
77
Basically, the drafters thought that placing the recorded 
recollection exception in Federal Rule of Evidence 803 was the 
least of three evils. Placing it in Federal Rule of Evidence 804 
did not quite make sense because the declarant’s unavailability 
under the recorded recollection exception was “of a limited and 
peculiar nature.”
 
78 The exception requires that the declarant 
have enough memory of an event to be able to testify that his 
recorded recollection accurately reflects his once-existing 
knowledge of the event but not enough memory to testify fully 
and accurately about the event.79 Under Rule 803(5), the de-
clarant must thus have “impaired memory,” which also caused 
the drafters of the recorded recollection rule not to place it in 
Rule 801(d)(1) for fear that a declarant with limited memory 
might not be deemed “subject to cross-examination” as is re-
quired under the Rule.80
 
 75. See FED. R. EVID. 804(a). 
 
 76. FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(3). 
 77. FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id.; see, e.g., State v. Thompson, 397 N.W.2d 679, 682 (Iowa 1986) 
(“[I]f the witness remembers an incident—such as an accident—but has forgot-
ten a detail—was the light red or green—the contents of his previous state-
ment relating to traffic signals should be admitted, provided the other tests of 
Rule 803(5) are met.” (quoting 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S 
EVIDENCE ¶ 803(5)[01], at 159-60 (1985))). 
 80. FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note. 
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That said, the recorded recollection exception is an uncom-
fortable fit in Federal Rule of Evidence 803. It seems inaccurate 
to say, as Rule 803 does, that a recorded recollection is admis-
sible “regardless of whether the declarant is available as a wit-
ness.”81
While the recorded recollection rule seems out of place in 
Rule 803, Rule 801(d)(1) would now fit the rule like a glove giv-
en the Supreme Court’s opinion in United States v. Owens.
 Instead, as the Advisory Committee noted, the declar-
ant of a recorded recollection must suffer from unavailability 
“of a limited and peculiar nature,” which, by implication, means 
that he must also be “available” to some degree. Therefore, ra-
ther than the availability of a Rule 803(5) declarant being un-
important, which is the case for all of the other Rule 803 excep-
tions, it is of the utmost importance. 
82 In 
Owens, “John Foster, a correctional counselor at the federal 
prison in Lompoc, California, was attacked and brutally beaten 
with a metal pipe.”83 Owens thereafter identified the defendant 
as his assailant during a photo array.84 At the defendant’s trial, 
Foster testified to severe memory loss such that he could not 
remember seeing his assailant and could not recall whether 
any people who visited him at the hospital suggested that the 
defendant was his assailant.85 The court thereafter permitted 
the prosecution to introduce Foster’s identification of the de-
fendant during the photo array pursuant to Federal Rule of Ev-
idence 801(d)(1)(C).86
After he was convicted, the defendant appealed, claiming, 
inter alia, that Foster’s memory loss meant that he was not 
“subject to cross-examination,” as is required by Federal Rule of 
Evidence 801(d)(1).
 
87
  It seems to us that the more natural reading of “subject to cross-
examination concerning the statement” includes what was available 
here. Ordinarily a witness is regarded as “subject to cross-
examination” when he is placed on the stand, under oath, and re-
sponds willingly to questions. Just as with the constitutional prohibi-
tion, limitations on the scope of examination by the trial court or as-
sertions of privilege by the witness may undermine the process to 
such a degree that meaningful cross-examination within the intent of 
the Rule no longer exists. But that effect is not produced by the wit-
 The Supreme Court disagreed, concluding: 
 
 81. FED. R. EVID. 803. 
 82. 484 U.S. 554 (1988). 
 83. Id. at 556. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id.  
 86. Id. at 557. 
 87. Id. at 561. 
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ness’ assertion of memory loss—which, as discussed earlier, is often 
the very result sought to be produced by cross-examination, and can 
be effective in destroying the force of the prior statement. Rule 
801(d)(1)(C), which specifies that the cross-examination need only 
“concer[n] the statement,” does not on its face require more.88
In reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected the argu-
ment that this reading of Rule 801(d)(1) created a “substantive 
inconsistency” with Rule 804(a)(3), finding instead that there 
was a mere “semantic oddity” or “verbal curiosity.”
 
89 According 
to the Court, it would be nonsensical to deem an “unavailable” 
declarant under Rule 804(a)(3) not “subject to cross-
examination” under Rule 801(d)(1) because that would mean 
that such a declarant could avoid the introduction of a prior in-
consistent statement “by simply asserting lack of memory of 
the facts to which the prior testimony related.”90
“subject to cross-examination” under Rule 801 while at the same time 
“unavailable” under Rule 804(a)(3). Quite obviously, the two charac-
terizations are made for two entirely different purposes and there is 
no requirement or expectation that they should coincide.
 Therefore, the 
Court concluded that a witness can be: 
91
Accordingly, the problem flagged in the Advisory Commit-
tee’s Note no longer exists. If a declarant takes the witness 
stand and admits that he has the impaired memory necessary 
for application of the recorded recollection exception, he is still 
“subject to cross-examination” by virtue of taking the witness 
stand.
 
92
Moreover, this recorded recollection rule should be moved 
to Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1). Like the statements ad-
mitted under the current exclusions under Rule 801(d)(1), rec-
orded recollections are admissible not because they were inher-
ently reliable when made, but instead because they are more 
reliable than the declarant’s trial testimony. If William sees 
Dan shoot Vince and sends a text message to his friend, Fred, 
to that effect two days later, that text message would not be 
admissible at trial if William takes the witness stand at Dan’s 
 Therefore, what is currently Federal Rule of Evidence 
803(5) could be moved to Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1). 
 
 88. Id. at 561–62. 
 89. Id. at 563. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 563–64. 
 92. See id.; see also United States v. Torrez-Ortega, 184 F.3d 1128, 1134 
n.3 (10th Cir. 1999) (“Owens bolsters its conclusion that the legitimately for-
getful witness is subject to cross-examination for purposes of Rule 801(d)(1)(C) 
by contrasting that evidentiary provision with the definition of ‘unavailability 
as a witness’ in Rule 804(a).”). 
  
54 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW HEADNOTES [98:34 
 
murder trial and testifies that he has “total recall” of the shoot-
ing. Instead, for a recorded recollection such as the text mes-
sage to be admissible as a recorded recollection, the declarant 
must be unable to testify fully and accurately because of im-
paired memory.93 Thus, recorded recollections are admissible 
because they are more reliable than the declarant’s trial testi-
mony, the same analysis that applies to prior inconsistent 
statements, prior consistent statements, and prior statements 
of identification.94 This reliability is bolstered by the fact that, 
as with all Rule 801(d)(1) statements,95 recorded recollections 
are “made closer in time to when the underlying events hap-
pened than a description produced in court at the time of the 
trial.”96
Also, like current Rule 801(d)(1) statements, recorded rec-
ollections are admissible for twin purposes. First, they are ad-
missible to corroborate the witness’ testimony and thus bolster 
his credibility. Recall the Blackett case from the introduction.
 
97 
In that case, the defendant allegedly threatened a juror. At tri-
al, the juror testified regarding the encounter but also claimed 
that she suffered from an impaired memory.98 As a result, pur-
suant to Rule 803(5), the court allowed the prosecution to in-
troduce the text messages that the juror sent soon after the en-
counter, with “the text message[s] corroborat[ing] [the juror]’s 
testimony and establish[ing] her credibility . . . .”99 Second, rec-
orded recollections are also admissible to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted: that the defendant in fact threatened the juror 
in the Blackett case.100
 
 93. See FED. R. EVID. 803(5)(A). 
 
 94. See supra notes 38–39, 46, 52 and accompanying text. 
 95. See id. 
 96. Kim Lane Scheppele, The Ground-Zero Theory of Evidence, 49 
HASTINGS L.J. 321, 329 (1998). 
 97. See United States v. Blackett, 481 Fed.App’x. 741 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 98. See id. As Professor Bellin notes in his article, the juror merely testi-
fied that that she did not remember the content of the text message while she 
appeared to have good recall of Blackett’s intimidation. See Bellin, supra note 
59, at 38. Therefore, it was questionable whether the text messages qualified 
as recorded recollections, a question that the Third Circuit did not resolve, 
finding that any possible error was harmless. See id.; see also Colin Miller, Q: 
What Does Nitroglycerin Mean? A: Not Guilty; 3rd Circuit Fails To Decide 
Whether Text Message Was Recorded Recollection, EVIDENCEPROF BLOG (June 
4, 2012), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/evidenceprof/2012/06/8035-text-us-v 
-blackettslip-copy-2012-wl-1925540ca3-virgin-islands2012.html. 
 99. See Blackett, 481 Fed.App’x at 742. 
 100. See id. 
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Finally, recorded recollections are similar to Rule 
801(d)(1)(A) prior inconsistent statements and most Rule 
801(d)(1)(C) statements of identification in that they are rec-
orded and thus can be repeated verbatim at trial.101 Therefore, 
unlike the case with other hearsay statements, there is no con-
cern with a recorded recollection that what the jury hears is 
different from what the defendant said/wrote.102
2. Why Proposed Rule 801(d)(1)(D) Makes Sense as an 
Extension of Rule 803(5) 
 
As noted, in the Blackett case, the court allowed the prose-
cution to admit text messages pursuant to Rule 803(5).103 This 
decision was not anomalous. Instead, several courts have al-
lowed parties to admit text messages pursuant to the recorded 
recollection exception. For example, in Simmons v. Common-
wealth, the victim of various sexual offenses allegedly commit-
ted by the defendant was able to read handwritten copies of 
text messages concerning the crimes under Kentucky’s version 
of Rule 803(5).104 In State v. Roseberry, the prosecution proved 
that a defendant was guilty of breaking and entering by having 
the victim, under Ohio’s version of Rule 803(5), read handwrit-
ten transcriptions of text messages in which the defendant dis-
cussed the crime.105 And, in State v. Loye, the victim was al-
lowed to testify concerning text messages pursuant to 
Minnesota’s version of Rule 803(5) to establish that she was the 
victim of domestic assault.106 Other courts, meanwhile, have al-
lowed for the introduction of e-mails pursuant to Rule 803(5).107
 
 101. See supra notes 
 
69–70 and accompanying text. 
 102. See, e.g., United States v. Jacoby, 955 F.2d 1527, 1539 (11th Cir. 1992) 
(“The court permitted Jacoby to impeach Merrill by reading verbatim the 
transcript of Merrill's grand jury testimony. Jacoby thus was able to develop 
fully before the jury the alleged inconsistencies between the witness’ trial and 
grand jury testimony.”). 
 103. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 104. See Simmons v. Commonwealth, No. 2012–SC–000064–MR, 2013 WL 
674721, at *2 (Ky. Feb. 21, 2013) (“The trial court did, however, allow E.J to 
read from her diary as during trial, she testified that she could not recall ex-
actly what Appellant had said to her during the message exchange.”). 
 105. See State v. Roseberry, 967 N.E.2d 233 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011) (“[T]he 
trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing Adams to read the series of 
text messages out loud pursuant to Evid.R. 803(5) . . . .”). 
 106. See State v. Loye, No. A08-1101, 2009 WL 1684425, at *2 (Minn. Ct. 
App. June 16, 2009). 
 107. See S.E.C. v. Daifotis, 874 F. Supp. 870, 878 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (“This 
email at least is admissible as past recollection recorded and/or under the re-
sidual exception.”); Weatherly v. Alabama State University, No. 2:10CV192–
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Therefore, many of the types of eHearsay that would be 
admissible under Professor Bellin’s Proposed Rule 801(d)(1)(D) 
are already admissible under Rule 803(5). That said, there are 
two important limitations in Rule 803(5) that exclude certain 
eHearsay that Professor Bellin’s Proposed Rule would now ac-
commodate. 
The first limitation in Rule 803(5) is that the recorded rec-
ollection exception applies only if the declarant testifies that he 
cannot testify fully and accurately about an event due to im-
paired memory.108
According to the Advisory Committee’s Note, the reason for 
the requirement of impaired memory is that “[t]he absence of 
the requirement . . . would encourage the use of statements 
carefully prepared for purposes of litigation under the supervi-
sion of attorneys, investigators, or claim adjusters.”
 So, assume that William sees Dan shoot 
Vince and, two days later, sends his friend, Fred, a text mes-
sage that says, “OMG! Dan killed Vince two days ago.” If, at 
Dan’s murder trial, William testifies that he has total recall of 
the shooting, his text message would be inadmissible under 
Rule 803(5).  
109
 
WHA, 2012 WL 274754, at *3 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 31, 2012) (“If the Plaintiffs seek 
to admit the substance of the email pursuant to Rule 803(5), as noted above, 
that attempt will be subject to objection by the Defendant at trial.”); Broadus 
v. CSX Transp., Inc., No. 08-1201, 2009 WL 1402025, at *5 (E.D. La. May 14, 
2009) (finding that an e-mail would be admissible as a recorded recollection if 
a witness could not recall the events in the e-mail); Kitterman v. Michigan 
Educational Employees Mut. Ins. Co., 2004 WL 1459523, No. 247428, at *4 
(Mich. Ct. App. June 29, 2004) (assuming without deciding that e-mails were 
admissible under Michigan Rule of Evidence 803(5)). 
 For in-
stance, it is easy to see Dan’s murder case being assigned to a 
detective, with the detective asking William to make a state-
ment days after the shooting and asking him leading questions 
that make it seem like William was certain that it was Dan 
who killed Vince. If Rule 803(5) did not require William to 
claim impaired memory on the witness stand, the prosecution 
could always corroborate William’s testimony with his police 
statement, which would hardly seem fair to Dan. Instead, Rule 
803(5) is reserved for cases in which a witness such as William 
 108. FED. R. EVID. 803(5)(A). See, e.g., Means v. Cullen, 297 F. Supp. 2d 
1148, 1151 (W.D. Wis. 2003) (“The content of defendant’s email does not quali-
fy as an admission by a party opponent because it is not offered against de-
fendant, see FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A), and it does not qualify as a recorded 
recollection because defendant has not shown that she cannot recall making 
the statement.”). 
 109. FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note. 
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is forgetful and his recorded recollection is thus necessary to 
get a full accounting of what happened. 
Conversely, assume again that, two days after the shoot-
ing, William sends his friend, Fred, a text message that says, 
“OMG! Dan killed Vince two days ago.” This text message, 
composed outside the shadow of litigation, seems fundamental-
ly different from the police statement in the other example. It 
also is exactly the type of recorded communication covered by 
Professor Bellin’s Proposed Rule because it is not “a statement 
made in contemplation of litigation or to a person who is inves-
tigating, litigating, or settling a potential or existing claim.”110
The second limitation in Rule 803(5) is that it applies only 
if the declarant testifies that the recorded recollection “accu-
rately reflects the witness’s knowledge.”
 
Therefore, Proposed Rule 801(d)(1)(D) fills a gap left by Rule 
803(5): it allows for the admission of eHearsay composed out-
side the shadow of litigation without the requirement of im-
paired memory by the declarant. 
111 Returning to the ex-
ample above involving the police statement, if William testifies 
at trial that he remembers some but not all details of the fatal 
shooting, the prosecution could introduce William’s police 
statement as a recorded recollection as long as William testifies 
that the statement accurately reflects what he saw.112
The prosecution, however, would have a fundamental prob-
lem. Presumably, William, who is now claiming that it was 
Carl who shot Vince, would not testify that his police statement 
accurately reflected what he saw. In that case, the police 
statement would not be admissible as a recorded recollection.
 Assume, 
however, that William surprisingly testifies that he saw Carl, 
and not Dan, fatally shoot Vince. At this point, the prosecution 
would want to introduce William’s police statement to contra-
dict what William said on the witness stand.  
113
 
 110. Bellin, supra note 
 
It would be admissible to impeach William pursuant to Rule 
59, at 36. 
 111. FED. R. EVID. 803(5). 
 112. See id. 
 113. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 967 S.W.2d 410, 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) 
(“Taylor never guaranteed that his memory was correctly transcribed or that 
the factual assertions contained in the statement were true.”); State v. Hol-
lingsworth, 337 S.E.2d 674, 676–77 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (“Since she testified 
that when she wrote the letter, it did not correctly reflect her knowledge of the 
events and she did not know facts that she had forgotten by the time of the 
trial, the trial court should not have admitted the letter into evidence as a rec-
orded recollection.”). 
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613,114 but it would not be admissible to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted pursuant to Rule 801(d)(1)(A) because it was 
not given under oath.115 Professor Bellin’s Proposed Rule thus 
fills another gap that currently exists in Rule 803(5): it allows 
for the admission of a recorded communication even if the wit-
ness does not testify that the communication “accurately re-
flects the witness’s knowledge.”116
The question, of course, is whether either of these gaps 
should be filled. The answer seems to be a clear “yes.” The only 
reason that Rule 803(5) requires an impaired memory is to pre-
vent the admission of statements carefully prepared with an 
eye toward litigation.
 
117 Proposed Rule 801(d)(1)(D) avoids this 
problem by requiring that eHearsay not be “made in contem-
plation of litigation.”118
Meanwhile, prior inconsistent statements covered by Pro-
posed Rule 801(d)(1)(D) are somewhat less reliable than prior 
inconsistent statements covered by Rule 801(d)(1)(A) because 
they are not given under oath. But, as noted, statements cov-
ered by Proposed Rule 801(d)(1)(D) are “not made in contem-
plation of litigation,” while statements covered by Rule 
801(d)(1)(A) are either given in contemplation of litigation (e.g., 
affidavits) or given as part of the litigation process (e.g., deposi-
tions).
 
119
II.  HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS AND THE PROBLEM WITH 
PROPOSED RULE 804(B)(5)   
 Therefore, even if a declarant disavows a prior tweet, 
text message, or e-mail, that recorded communication seeming-
ly possesses reliability commensurate with the reliability of a 
prior inconsistent statement given under oath.  
In addition to the proposed eHearsay exclusion that Pro-
fessor Bellin locates in Rule 801(d)(1), he creates a proposed 
eHearsay exception to be placed in Federal Rule of Evidence 
804(b). That Rule, Proposed Rule 804(a)(5), would create the 
following hearsay exception in the case of an “unavailable” de-
clarant: 
Recorded Statement of Recent Perception. A recorded communication 
that describes or explains an event or condition recently perceived by 
 
 114. See FED. R. EVID. 613. 
 115. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A). 
 116. Cf. FED. R. EVID. 803(5)(C). 
 117. FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note. 
 118. Bellin, supra note 59, at 36. 
 119. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A). 
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the declarant, but not including: (A) a statement made in contempla-
tion of litigation, or to a person who is investigating, litigating, or set-
tling a potential or existing claim; or (B) an anonymous statement.120
This Rule would thus apply if the declarant does not ap-
pear on the witness stand because the proponent could not lo-
cate him
 
121 or the declarant passed away before trial.122 It would 
also apply if the declarant validly invoked a privilege123 or simp-
ly refused to testify despite being held in contempt of court.124
A. THE RESIDUAL EXCEPTION AND EQUIVALENT 
CIRCUMSTANTIAL GUARANTEES OF TRUSTWORTHINESS 
 
The question, then, is whether the declarant’s testimony should 
be a necessary element for the admission of eHearsay or 
whether the declarant’s unavailability is sufficient for its intro-
duction. 
Federal Rule of Evidence 807 creates a residual hearsay 
exception for a hearsay statement that is “not specifically cov-
ered by a hearsay exception in Rule 803 or 804” but that, inter 
alia, “has equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthi-
ness.”125
 
 120. Bellin , supra note 
 Under the logic of Rule 807, then, it would make sense 
59, at 36. 
 121. See FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(5). Rule 804(a)(5) provides that a declarant is 
“unavailable” if the declarant: 
is absent from the trial or hearing and the statement’s proponent has 
not been able, by process or other reasonable means, to procure: (A) 
the declarant’s attendance, in the case of a hearsay exception under 
Rule 804(b)(1) or (6); or (B) the declarant’s attendance or testimony, 
in the case of a hearsay exception under Rule 804(b)(2), (3), or (4). 
 122. See FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(4). Rule 804(a)(4) provides that a declarant is 
“unavailable” if the declarant “cannot be present or testify at the trial or hear-
ing because of death or a then-existing infirmity, physical illness, or mental 
illness . . . .” 
 123. See FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(1). Rule 804(a)(1) provides that a declarant is 
“unavailable” if the declarant “is exempted from testifying about the subject 
matter of the declarant’s statement because the court rules that a privilege 
applies . . . .” 
 124. See FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(2). Rule 804(a)(2) provides that a declarant is 
“unavailable” if the declarant “refuses to testify about the subject matter de-
spite a court order to do so . . . .” 
 125. FED. R. EVID. 807. In its entirety, Rule 807(a) states: 
Under the following circumstances, a hearsay statement is not ex-
cluded by the rule against hearsay even if the statement is not specif-
ically covered by a hearsay exception in Rule 803 or 804: (1) the 
statement has equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthi-
ness; (2) it is offered as evidence of a material fact; (3) it is more pro-
bative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence that 
the proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts; and (4) admit-
ting it will best serve the purposes of these rules and the interests of 
justice. 
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to create a new hearsay rule only if the new rule covered 
statements containing circumstantial guarantees of trustwor-
thiness equivalent to those in a comparable existing hearsay 
exception.126
For instance, in Stamm v. New York City Transit Authori-
ty, the plaintiff brought an action pursuant to the Americans 
with Disabilities Act and related laws, claiming that the New 
York City Transit Authority (NYCTA) and the Manhattan and 
Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority “failed to ensure 
that their vehicles and facilities are accessible to her and other 
persons with disabilities who utilize service animals.”
 Indeed, in the absence of an eHearsay exception, 
litigants frequently have tried to admit recorded communica-
tions under Rule 807, with courts deciding the validity of such 
attempts by considering comparable existing hearsay excep-
tions.  
127 There-
after, the plaintiff brought an ADA retaliation claim against 
the NYCTA, asserting that it refused to permit her access to an 
empty articulated bus in response to her initial lawsuit.128
In response the NYCTA sought to admit into evidence an e-
mail that employee Michael Levy sent on July 19, 2004 denying 
the plaintiff access to an articulated bus.
 
129 This e-mail would 
have helped the NYCTA’s case because the plaintiff did not 
bring her lawsuit until January 23, 2008, and there is a three-
year statute of limitations on retaliation claims under the 
ADA.130
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
New York found that the e-mail was not admissible under the 
business records exception to the rule against hearsay (Rule 
803(6)) because the NYCTA did not “provid[e] sufficient evi-
dence to establish that these e-mails were records ‘kept in the 
course of regularly conducted activity’ and made as part of ‘the 
regular practice of that activity.’”
 
131
 
 126. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Daifotis, 874 F. Supp. 2d 870, 878 (N.D. Cal 2012) 
(finding that, even if an e-mail was not admissible under the recorded recollec-
tion exception, it could still be admissible under the residual exception be-
cause it contained equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness). 
 That said, the court noted 
that Levy followed up the e-mail by informing his colleagues of 
 127. Stamm v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., No. 04–CV–2163, 2013 WL 244793, at 
*1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2013). 
 128. Id. at *8. 
 129. Id. at *9. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at *11 (citing FED. R. EVID. 803(6)(B) and (C)). 
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the denial.132 Therefore, the court found that the e-mail was 
admissible under Rule 807, concluding that because “Levy was 
attempting to be precise and knew his co-workers would rely on 
his statements, there are circumstantial guarantees of trust-
worthiness equivalent to those underlying the business records 
exception.”133 Conversely, in Mercer v. Csiky, the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan found that a 
business e-mail did not qualify for admission under Rule 807 
because it did not contain circumstantial guarantees of trust-
worthiness equivalent to those of a business record under Rule 
803(6).134
As Professor Bellin notes, Rule 801(d)(1)(D) is modeled af-
ter the “Statement of Recent Perception” hearsay exception 
that was rejected by Congress in 1973, which would have al-
lowed for the admission of: 
 
[a] statement, not in response to the instigation of a person engaged 
in investigating, litigating, or settling a claim, which narrates, de-
scribes, or explains an event or condition recently perceived by the 
declarant, made in good faith, not in contemplation of pending or an-
ticipated litigation in which he was interested, and while his recollec-
tion was clear.135
In effect, this rejected hearsay exception would have ex-
tended the timeline created by Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1), 
which provides a hearsay exception for “[a] statement describ-
ing or explaining an event or condition, made while or immedi-
ately after the declarant perceived it.”
 
136 This “present sense 
impression” exception covers statements made by a declarant 
within seconds or minutes after perceiving an event or condi-
tion;137
 
 132. Id. at *10. Specifically, Levy informed his colleagues that: “I left a 
message for Ms. Stamm at 9:30 AM today 7–19–04, informing her that the 
Department of Buses could not provide the training she requested. I referred 
her to DOB Customer Relations if she had further questions.” Id. 
 the proposed Statement of Recent Perception exception 
 133. Id. 
 134. Mercer v. Csiky, No. 08–11443–BC, 2010 WL 3565811, at *5–6. (E.D. 
Mich. Sept. 13, 2010). The plaintiffs had claimed that the e-mail was “suffi-
ciently trustworthy because, if it [were] intentionally false, it would [have] 
subject[ed] [the writer] to legal action under state law (e.g., for slander).” Id. at 
*6. 
 135. PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR UNITED 
STATES DISTRICT COURTS AND MAGISTRATES, 46 F.R.D. 161, 377–78 (1969).  
 136. FED. R. EVID. 803(1). 
 137. See, e.g., Douglas D. McFarland, Present Sense Impressions Cannot 
Live in the Past, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 907, 919–20 (2001) (“While twenty-
three minutes appears to be the longest ‘slight lapse’ allowed, other decisions 
have approved the admission of present sense impressions uttered a few se-
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and Professor Bellin’s proposed eHearsay exclusion would cover 
statements made up to eight days after perceiving an event or 
condition.138
In determining whether Proposed Rule 804(b)(5) passes 
muster, the question thus becomes whether eHearsay by an 
unavailable declarant, on the one hand, and a classic present 
sense impression by an unavailable declarant, on the other, 
possess equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthi-
ness. In making this determination, consider the following two 
hypotheticals. In the first hypothetical, William sees Dan shoot 
Vince and immediately turns to Fred and says, “Oh my god! 
Brian’s brother Dan totally killed Vince! You don’t mess with 
those guys. I feel sick.” In the second hypothetical, the day after 
the shooting, William tweets the following message on his 
Twitter account: “WTG! Brian’s brother Dan totally KILLED 
Vince in the parking lot behind O’Sullivan’s Tavern yesterday! 
You don’t mess with those guys. #SICK” 
  
If William passes away before Dan’s trial for murdering 
Vince, the prosecution would likely try to (1) have Fred testify 
concerning William’s statement in the first hypothetical, and 
(2) introduce William’s tweet in the second hypothetical. Pro-
fessor Bellin identifies the one reason to prefer the tweet to 
Fred’s testimony: with nonrecorded hearsay such as William’s 
present sense impression, “[t]he testifying witness may mis-
hear, misremember, miscommunicate or (worst of all) manufac-
ture the out-of-court speaker’s statement.”139
 
conds, one minute, three to five minutes, five minutes, seven minutes, five to 
ten minutes, ten minutes, fourteen and one-half minutes, and at least eight-
een minutes after the event.”) (citations omitted). As the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey noted in State ex rel. J.A., 949 A.2d 790, 798 (N.J. 2008): 
 Conversely, the 
tweet is recorded, and, if preserved, can be presented to the ju-
ry in its original form. In this regard, the tweet could be said to 
have a greater circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness 
than the classic present sense impression. 
  When considering whether a statement is a present sense impres-
sion, it is not hairsplitting to recognize a distinction between a matter 
of seconds, however many they may be, and an interval of as much as 
ten minutes separating a recollection from the observation. For pur-
poses of a present sense impression, a declarant's statement that “the 
blue sports car is going through the red light” or that “the blue sports 
car just went through the red light” (seconds ago) is different from a 
declarant's statement that “the blue sports car went through the red 
light ten minutes ago.” 
 138. Bellin, supra note 59, at 143 n.137. 
 139. Id. at 38. 
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Continuing this analysis, however, there are four problems 
whenever a declarant makes a hearsay statement. That state-
ment is always somewhat unreliable because of possible deficits 
in “perception, memory, narration, and sincerity.”140 As noted, 
hearsay evidence is generally inadmissible both because such 
evidence is unreliable and because the jury has an inability to 
assess that unreliability at trial.141 On the other hand, hearsay 
that qualifies for admission under a Rule 803 or 804 exception 
is admissible because it contains circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness that quell concerns about one or more of the 
possible deficits. The following four subsections will compare 
the classic present sense impression from the first hypothetical 
with the eHearsay in the second hypothetical to see how each 
fares in this regard.142
1. Memory 
 
A present sense impression is thought to be reliable pri-
marily because there is little to no problem with the declarant’s 
memory when he speaks. Under Rule 803(1), a present sense 
impression must be “made while or immediately after the de-
clarant perceived” an event or condition.143 Therefore, in the 
first hypothetical, William would be telling Fred that Dan 
killed Vince while watching Dan kill Vince or, at most, a few 
minutes later.144 As the Ninth Circuit has noted, “[t]he reason 
present sense impressions are considered inherently reliable is 
because statements contemporaneously describing an event are 
unlikely to reflect memory loss or provide an opportunity to 
lie.”145
Professor Bellin’s proposed eHearsay exception, however, 
would allow for the admission of statements made up to eight 
 
 
 140. Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2249 (2012). 
 141. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 142. See, e.g., Lasnick v. Morgan, No. 3:10–cv–345, 2011 WL 6300159, at *2 
(D. Conn. Dec. 15, 2011) (“In assessing the trustworthiness of a statement for 
purposes of Rule 807, a court should be mindful of the ‘four classes of risk pe-
culiar to [hearsay] evidence: those of (1) insincerity, (2) faulty perception, (3) 
faulty memory, and (4) faulty narration.’”) (quoting Schering Corp. v. Pfizer 
Inc., 189 F.3d 218, 232 (2d Cir. 1999)). 
 143. FED. R. EVID. 803(1). 
 144. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
 145. United States v. Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d 1131, 1147 (9th Cir. 2012); see 
also United States v. Jones, 299 F.3d 103, 112 (2d Cir. 2002) (“Such state-
ments are considered to be trustworthy because the contemporaneity of the 
event and its description limits the possibility for intentional deception or fail-
ure of memory.”). 
  
64 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW HEADNOTES [98:34 
 
days after a declarant perceives an event or condition.146 Cur-
rently, “courts consistently require substantial contemporanei-
ty”147 between event/condition and statement under Rule 
803(1); Professor Bellin’s new exception would cross this line in 
the sand by “cover[ing] a declarant’s relatively recent memo-
ries.”148 As noted, such statements about older events and con-
ditions are not admissible under Rule 803(1), and Federal Rule 
of Evidence 803(3), which contains the “state of mind” hearsay 
exception, specifically excludes from its auspices “a statement 
of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or be-
lieved.”149
The reason for this line-drawing is obvious: “[s]hort-term 
memory degrades within minutes or hours.”
 
150 Therefore, when 
more than a few minutes have passed after a declarant per-
ceives an event or condition, his “memories decline[] precipi-
tously” as his short-term memory begins to transfer, often im-
perfectly, into his long-term memory.151
 
 146. See supra note 
 Therefore, a statement 
admitted under Proposed Rule 804(b)(5) is more likely to be 
based on a faulty memory than is a statement admitted under 
Rule 803(1). 
138 and accompanying text. 
 147. United States v. Green, 556 F.3d 151, 156 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 148. United States v. Manfre, 368 F.3d 832, 840 (8th Cir. 2004) (declining 
to extend the present-sense-impression exception to “relatively recent memo-
ries”). 
 149. FED. R. EVID. 803(3). Rule 803(3) provides an exception to the rule 
against hearsay for: 
A statement of the declarant’s then-existing state of mind (such as 
motive, intent, or plan) or emotional, sensory, or physical condition 
(such as mental feeling, pain, or bodily health), but not including a 
statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or be-
lieved unless it relates to the validity or terms of the declarant’s will. 
According to the Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 803: 
The exclusion of “statements of memory or belief to prove the fact re-
membered or believed” is necessary to avoid the virtual destruction of 
the hearsay rule which would otherwise result from allowing state of 
mind, provable by a hearsay statement, to serve as the basis for an in-
ference of the happening of the event which produced the state of 
mind. 
 150. Thomas Earl Geu, The Tao of Jurisprudence: Chaos, Brain Science, 
Synchronicity, and the Law, 61 TENN. L. REV. 933, 958 (1994). 
 151. Jascha Hoffman, Suspect Memories, LEGAL AFF., Jan./Feb. 2005, at 
42, 43; see also Aviva Orenstein, “My God!”: A Feminist Critique of the Excited 
Utterance Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 85 CAL. L. REV. 159, 179 n.70 (1997) 
(“Memory of five minutes ago is linked to long-term memory rather than short-
term memory . . . .”). 
  
2013] NO EXPLANATION REQUIRED? 65 
 
2. Sincerity 
The second main reason why present sense impressions are 
admissible is tied to the first. As noted, the Ninth Circuit has 
concluded that present sense impressions made contemporane-
ously with events/conditions are “inherently reliable . . . be-
cause statements contemporaneously describing an event are 
unlikely to reflect memory loss or provide an opportunity to 
lie.”152 The general principle is that the shorter the period of 
time between event/condition and statement, the more trust-
worthy the statement because the declarant has little oppor-
tunity to fabricate a story about the event/condition; “[t]he 
longer the time, the less trustworthy, since there is more time 
and opportunity to fabricate.”153
Apart from the timing issue, there are other reasons to be-
lieve that eHearsay might be less sincere than a classic present 
sense impression. Experts in communication have concluded 
that “people are more likely to lie online especially in social 
networking sites like Facebook, MySpace and . . . on the dating 
or ‘search soul mates’ types of websites.”
 Under this test, there would be 
reason to believe that eHearsay composed hours or days after 
an event or condition could be less sincere than a present sense 
impression made during or minutes after that event or condi-
tion.  
154 Specifically, 
“[o]nline communication is a fast process as compared to the 
authentic ways of communication that we have been accus-
tomed since childhood,” increasing the likelihood of lies.155
Moreover, research has revealed that people are better at 
lying in electronic communications than in face-to-face commu-
nications.
 
156
 
 152. See supra note 
 According to forensic psychologist Michael Wood-
worth: 
145 and accompanying text. 
 153. People v. Thomas, 730 N.E.2d 618, 625 (Ill. Ct. App. 2000), abrogated 
by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). See also People v. Hendrick-
son, 586 N.W.2d 906, 915 (Mich. 1988) (Brickey, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (“The statement is likely to be reliable because it is made be-
fore the declarant has an opportunity to fabricate, embellish, or forget what is 
being described.”). 
 154. Ruben Supramanyam, More Likely to Lie on Social Network, 
AVOIDFACEBOOK (March 7, 2011, 6:15 PM), http://www.avoidfacebook.com/ 
2011/03/07/more-likely-to-lie-on-social-network/. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Raina Ducklow & Bud Mortenson, What Lies Behind the Online 
Words?, 55 U.B.C. REPORTS, April 2, 2009, http://www.publicaffairs.ubc.ca/ 
ubcreports/2009/09apr02/behind.html. 
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  When people are interacting face to face, there is something called 
the ‘motivational impairment effect,’ where your body will give off 
some cues as you become more nervous and there’s more at stake 
with your lie . . . . In a computer-mediated environment, the exact op-
posite occurs. . . . 
. . . . 
  When telling a lie face-to-face, the higher the stakes of your decep-
tion, the more cues you may give out that you’re lying. So, what isn’t 
in a text message may have advantages for a would-be deceiver: text 
doesn’t transmit non-verbal cues such as vocal properties, physical 
gestures, and facial expressions.157
Finally, even if a declarant is not consciously lying in a 
tweet, text message, or e-mail, the declarant may not be con-
veying what he means to convey. Research has shown “that 
people are better at communicating and interpreting tone in 
vocal messages than in text-based ones.”
 
158
All of the above research could call into question the ad-
missibility of any eHearsay. Recall, though, that Proposed Rule 
801(d)(1)(D) requires a declarant such as William to testify and 
subject himself to cross-examination for his recorded communi-
cation to be admitted.
 Recall again the 
prior tweet from William in the second hypothetical: “WTG! 
Brian’s brother Dan totally KILLED Vince in the parking lot 
behind O’Sullivan’s Tavern yesterday! You don’t mess with 
those guys. #SICK.” Was the declarant being serious and sin-
cere when he composed this tweet? Was this tweet a joke about 
an event that never actually happened? Was the tweet an ex-
aggeration? The research tends to show that William will have 
more difficulty conveying, and people reading the tweet (includ-
ing jurors) will have more difficulty interpreting, William’s tone 
than if William had told Fred that he saw Dan shoot Vince—
the classic present sense impression. 
159 Was the tweet sincere, a joke, or an ex-
aggeration? By taking the oath, subjecting himself to cross-
examination, and being fully on display for the jury, a declar-
ant such as William allows the jury to draw its own conclusions 
about the sincerity of the tweet.160
 
 157. Id. 
 Conversely, under Proposed 
Rule 804(b)(5), all the jury has is the cold, antiseptic tweet, 
without any opportunity to judge whether William did a poor 
job of conveying tone in the tweet or whether the tweet was an 
outright lie. 
 158. Lea Winerman, E-mails and Egos, 37 MONITOR, Feb. 2006, http://www 
.apa.org/monitor/feb06/egos.aspx. 
 159. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 160. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
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3. Narration 
Any hearsay statement contains the inherent possibility 
that it contains errors in narration, i.e. “the risk that the de-
clarant may misspeak or be misunderstood.”161 Obviously, there 
is some overlap here with the discussion in the previous section 
about people being better at communicating and interpreting 
tone in vocal messages than in text-based ones.162
Again, in the first hypothetical, William sees Dan shoot 
Vince and immediately turns to Fred and says, “Oh my god! 
Brian’s brother Dan totally killed Vince! You don’t mess with 
those guys. I feel sick.” In the second hypothetical, the day after 
the shooting, William tweets the following message on his 
Twitter account: “WTG! Brian’s brother Dan totally KILLED 
Vince in the parking lot behind O’Sullivan’s Tavern yesterday! 
You don’t mess with those guys. #SICK” 
 In this sec-
tion, however, the focus will solely be on ambiguous and incor-
rect statements of fact in communications. 
If William’s tweet is admitted at trial without William tes-
tifying, the jury could easily have several problems in analyz-
ing the tweet. Dan’s defense might be that he has another 
brother named Carl and that William must have meant to say 
Carl and not Dan because Dan never attacked Vince. Alternate-
ly, Dan could claim that when William tweeted that Dan “total-
ly KILLED Vince,” he was talking about a verbal argument 
that Dan won rather than a physical attack. Or, Dan could 
claim that by “totally KILLED,” William meant that Dan won a 
fight with Vince but did not come close to killing him.  
Assume that Vince died in the parking lot of a Burger 
King, with that parking lot being behind the parking lot for 
O’Sullivan’s Tavern and across the street. When William re-
ferred to “the parking lot behind O’Sullivan’s Tavern,” was he 
referring to the parking lot for O’Sullivan’s Tavern or the Burg-
er King parking lot? And what about William’s statement that 
“[y]ou don’t mess with those guys”? Does this mean that Vince 
was the first aggressor? Does William mean that Vince was 
merely insulting or taunting Dan? Or was William merely as-
suming that Vince must have done something to anger Dan de-
spite possessing no actual knowledge of a provoking act? And 
 
 161. Peter Nicolas, But What if the Court Reporter Is Lying? The Right to 
Confront Hidden Declarants Found in Transcripts of Former Testimony, 2010 
B.Y.U. L. REV. 1149, 1153 (2010). 
 162. See supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
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who are “those guys”? Is William referring to Dan and his 
brother Brian or some other guys? 
Finally, what is meant by #SICK? People use the #/hashtag 
to categorize tweets “and help them show more easily in Twit-
ter Search.”163
If William is unavailable to testify, as is required by Pro-
posed Rule 804(b)(5), the jury may never get a good answer to 
any of these questions. Yes, William could follow up this tweet 
with other, clarifying tweets on his own. And yes, other Twitter 
users could reply to William’s tweet, prompting him to tweet 
follow-up tweets. There is, however, no guarantee of such clari-
fication. 
 But what did William mean when he tweeted 
#SICK? Was he literally sick, and if so, was he sick at the time 
that he observed the attack, if it was even an actual attack? If 
so, was the sickness one that might hinder his perception or 
memory of the attack? Or, by tweeting #SICK, was William 
merely signifying that Dan’s act of violence made him feel up-
set and disturbed? 
Comparing this hypothetical to the first hypothetical, it is 
easy to see why the chance of confusion or error is much lower 
with a classic present sense impression. Again, in that hypo-
thetical, William sees Dan shoot Vince and immediately turns 
to Fred and makes his statement. Fred then later takes the 
witness stand and repeats William’s statement to the jury.  
Was William literally sick when he made the statement? 
Fred can testify about whether William appeared to be sick. 
What did William mean by, “You don’t mess with those guys”? 
Fred also observed the encounter and can testify as to whether 
and to what extent Vince was provoking Dan. Fred can also 
clarify the exact location of the encounter because he was there. 
Because he was present, Fred can also clarify whether the 
words “totally killed” referred to a physical altercation and, if 
so, whether it involved lethal or nonlethal force. Was it Dan or 
his brother Carl who killed Vince? Fred, as another observer, 
can state on the witness stand that William likely misspoke or 
spoke accurately. Moreover, because Fred is present when Wil-
liam makes the statement, he can easily ask William for clarifi-
cation or correction of his statement if he thinks that William 
misspoke.  
 
 163. See Using Hashtags on Twitter, TWITTER HELP CENTER, https:// 
support.twitter.com/entries/49309-what-are-hashtags-symbols (last visited 
Nov. 2, 2013). 
  
2013] NO EXPLANATION REQUIRED? 69 
 
All of these considerations lead to the conclusion that pos-
sible errors in narration pose a greater problem when eHearsay 
is admitted under Proposed Rule 804(b)(5) than when a classic 
present sense impression is admitted under Rule 803(1). More-
over, there are problems with narration inherent in many of 
the media used for electronic communications. A person using 
Twitter can use only 140 characters in a tweet,164 and a person 
sending a text message is generally limited to 160 characters.165 
The tweet in the second hypothetical had 140 characters, and it 
is easy to see how the character limit makes it difficult for a 
person to include all “material information to ensure the com-
munication is complete and accurate.”166
One way that people try to cram an entire message into a 
tweet or text message is by using acronyms. For example, in 
the second hypothetical, William used the acronym, “WTG!” 
The problem is that many acronyms have multiple meanings, 
which can create confusion. According to the Urban Dictionary, 
“WTG” can mean “Way to Go,” which would seem to imply that 
William approved of Dan’s actions.
 
167 But the Urban Dictionary 
also states that “WTG” can mean “Wow That’s Great,” but with 
that phrase often being used sarcastically.168 So, was William 
making the sarcastic observation that what happened was not 
great, or was he using the term literally, again to show approv-
al? Finally, the Urban Dictionary also states that “WTG” can 
also mean “What the Ghetto.”169
The same concerns, of course, apply when a person sending 
a text or tweet uses an abbreviation to save space, with that 
abbreviation possibly meaning several things. For example, as-
sume that the tweet in the second hypothetical did not say that 
 So, was William commenting 
that the fight between Dan and Vince was only something that 
you see in the ghetto? It is easy to see William using “WTG” in 
any of these three or other ways, and, without his testimony, it 
is impossible to know exactly what he meant.  
 
 164. See, e.g., People v. Harris, 945 N.Y.S.2d 505, 507 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2012) 
(explaining how Twitter works). 
 165. Lozano v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 702 F. Supp. 2d 999, 
1001 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (explaining how SMS text messaging works). 
 166. Alexis Cairo & Randy L. Dryer, Emerging Legal and Ethical Issues in 
the Brave New World of Social Media and Corporate Transparency, 56 Rocky 
Mountain Mineral Inst. 3-1 (2010). 
 167. See WTG, URBAN DICTIONARY, http://www.urbandictionary.com/define 
.php?term=wtg (last visited Nov. 2, 2013). 
 168. See id. 
 169. See id. 
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Dan was Brian’s brother but that (1) the tweet did mention 
Brian; and (2) the tweet contained the sentence “What a bther!” 
In this tweet, the sentence “What a bthr!” could easily mean 
“What a brother!” or “What a bother!,” with each word creating 
different meanings. 
Finally, narration problems are also inherent in text mes-
sages and some other electronic media due to cramped key-
boards and predictive software like AutoCorrect.170
Typists working on cramped keypads inevitably mistype important 
words, simplify complex events, and omit critical details. Software in-
novations designed to counteract these limitations correct perceived 
spelling mistakes in real time and even attempt to predict the typist’s 
words, sometimes with limited success.
 As Professor 
Bellin has noted elsewhere:  
171
For instance, assume in the second hypothetical that Wil-
liam sent a text message stating that “Dan killed Vince.” If 
Dan’s defense is that a man named Mike Dahn killed Vince, is 
it possible that, while William was composing his text, his tex-
ting software autocorrected Dahn to Dan? Or, assume that the 
prosecution seeks to use a text message sent by William stating 
that “Dahn killed Vince” to prove that Dan killed Vince. The 
question would then be whether William intentionally wrote 
“Dahn” or whether William accidentally pressed the “h” key, 
just above the “n” key, in between touching the “a” and “n” keys 
while trying to type “Dan.” If William testifies, he can explain 
what he meant; if William is absent, as is required by Proposed 
Rule 804(b)(5), the jurors will get no such explanation. Instead, 
the jurors will be like college students in a study cited by Pro-
fessor Bellin in a previous article that: 
 
describe[ed] the increasing popularity of “predictive texting software,” 
and contrast[ed] the widespread errors made by college students 
asked to interpret text messages from other students with the relative 
absence of interpretive errors when the texters were forced to write 
out the same messages without abbreviations and texting short-
hand.172
4. Perception 
 
Finally, any hearsay statement carries an inherent risk of 
reflecting errors in perception, i.e., “the risk that the declarant 
may have inaccurately perceived the events at issue in her 
 
 170. Jeffrey Bellin, Facebook, Twitter, and the Uncertain Future of Present 
Sense Impressions, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 331, 364–65 (2012). 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 365 n.122. 
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statement.”173
If William turns to Fred during the killing or immediately 
thereafter and makes his statement, the jury at least has some 
tools to judge whether William made a perception error. How 
far away was William from Dan and Vince? Did William arrive 
after the fight had started, or was he there the whole time? 
Was William distracted, or was his full attention focused on the 
encounter? Fred might not be able to answer all of these and 
similar questions, but he can at least give some indication of 
William’s vantage point and whether the surrounding circum-
stances heightened or lessened the chance that William mis-
perceived the encounter. 
 In either of the two hypotheticals, maybe William 
thought that Dan had killed Vince despite the fact that Vince 
was still alive after their encounter. Maybe William thought 
that the encounter took place in the parking lot behind 
O’Sullivan’s Tavern when it actually took place in the parking 
lot behind O’Malley’s Tavern. Or maybe William thought that 
he saw Dan kill Vince when it was in fact Dan’s brother Carl, 
who bears a striking resemblance to Dan. 
Conversely, consider again the second hypothetical in 
which William tweets that Dan killed Vince the day before. 
Under Proposed Rule 804(b)(5), William is, by definition, “una-
vailable,” and thus cannot explain his vantage point. In some 
cases, there might be another witness such as Fred who was at 
the encounter and who can testify concerning what William 
likely saw. In many other cases, however, the jury will be left to 
speculate about just how much William saw and did not see, 
and thus about the likelihood that his recorded communication 
was the result of a perception error.  
  CONCLUSION   
Jeffrey Bellin’s article, eHearsay, makes an extraordinarily 
important contribution to the scant scholarship on the intersec-
tion between electronic evidence and the rules of evidence. 
Crafted in the 1970s out of common law rules that are centu-
ries older, the Federal Rules of Evidence were born out of a 
world in which the preeminent form of communication occurred 
face-to-face. Courts understandably have struggled in attempt-
ing to retrofit these analog rules to a digital world, and Profes-
sor Bellin’s article wisely resurrects the rejected Statement of 
Recent Perception exception to create a hearsay exclusion cov-
 
 173. Nicolas, supra note 161, at 1153. 
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ering recorded communications made outside the shadow of lit-
igation when the declarant can take the witness stand and ex-
plain what he wrote. Conversely, without the declarant taking 
the witness stand to explain tone, vantage point, and ambigui-
ties, a recorded communication loses much of its reliability. 
Therefore, Proposed Rule 801(d)(1)(B), which requires the de-
clarant to testify, should be adopted, but Proposed Rule 
804(b)(5), which requires the declarant’s unavailability, should 
not. 
 
